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Administrator of the Estate of Jonathan Walski, Deceased; 
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       WATKINS AND MEDURA 
 
       Appellants 
 
Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
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District Judge: Honorable A. Richard Caputo 
 
Argued March 23, 1999 
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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
ROTH, Circuit Judge. 
 
The facts of this case are tragic. A dentist, defendant 
William Watkins, decided to anesthetize a three-year old 
boy in order to repair dental cavities. Watkins used the 
services of an independent dental anesthesiologist to 
administer general anesthesia in Watkins's office. While the 
boy was anesthetized, he suffered cardiac arrest and died. 
This appeal is from a declaratory judgment action in which 
Watkins' insurance company, Medical Protective Co., 
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sought a ruling that Watkins and his partnership were not 
covered by the Medical Protective policies. The significant 
policy language was a clause that excluded coverage for 
"any liability arising from the administration of any form of 
anesthesia in dosage designed to render the patient 
unconscious unless administered in a hospital." 
 
The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of 
the insurance company, holding that the language of the 
exclusionary clause was unambiguous and applicable to 
the case at hand. In addition, the District Court held that 
the doctrine of reasonable expectations was inapplicable. 
 
For the reasons stated below, we will reverse and remand 
the case to the District Court. 
 
I. FACTS 
 
William Watkins, D.D.S., is a licensed dentist in Dallas, 
Pennsylvania, practicing in a partnership known as 
Watkins and Medura. Dr. Watkins does not have, and never 
has had, a license to administer anesthesia. Rather, 
throughout the period that Dr. Watkins and Watkins and 
Medura (collectively, the "Watkins defendants") were 
covered under the policies at issue, they had made 
arrangements with Dr. Joseph Mazula, a licensed oral 
surgeon and dental anesthesiologist, to administer 
anesthesia to patients, when needed, in the Watkins offices. 
Dr. Mazula had administered general anesthesia in Dr. 
Watkins' office since as early as 1979, up until May 1996. 
Although Dr. Mazula performed these services at Dr. 
Watkins' office and used some equipment supplied by 
Watkins and Medura, Dr. Mazula was not employed by Dr. 
Watkins or the partnership. 
 
In January 1985, Dr. Watkins completed a Medical 
Protective insurance application that contained numerous 
questions about his and the partnership's dental practice. 
He provided the following answers to Question 13 on the 
application: 
 
       Do you or an employee of your administer general 
       anesthesia? [yes or no]  no . In a dental office? [yes 
       or no]  no . In a hospital? [yes or no]  no . Other? 
       [yes or no] ___. Types of anesthetic used? _______. 
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No question on Medical Protective's application asked the 
applicant whether anyone other than the applicant or the 
applicant's employee ever administered general anesthesia 
in the applicant's office. 
 
Plaintiff Medical Protective Company issued malpractice 
insurance policies to the Watkins defendants that provided 
coverage for "any claim for damages, at any timefiled, 
based on professional services rendered or which should 
have been rendered, by the insured or any other person for 
whose acts or omissions the insured is legally responsible 
in the practice of the insured's profession." The policies also 
contained a clause, referred to as Exclusion 100: 
 
       This policy does not cover any liability arising from the 
       administration of any form of anesthesia in dosage 
       designed to render the patient unconscious unless 
       administered in a hospital. 
 
Dr. Watkins' policy also contained an "expanded coverage 
endorsement" (Endorsement 540) that stated that the policy 
was amended to add Paragraph A(7), an exclusion for: 
 
       any liability the insured, named in the policy, incurs 
       under a contract or agreement; provided that this 
       exclusion does not apply to: 
 
       . . . 
 
       (c) Any liability the insured incurs in rendering 
       professional services under any contract or 
       agreement with another dentist or other provider of 
       professional services in the practice of the 
       insured's profession; or 
 
       (d) Any liability the insured incurs in rendering 
       professional services in connection with furnishing 
       therapeutic agents or supplies in the practice of 
       the insured's profession. 
 
In light of the various policy provisions and the application 
he filled out, Dr. Watkins concluded when he read 
Exclusion 100 that "since I was not administering the 
anesthesia, that didn't really pertain to me, that I would 
have coverage if someone else was administering the 
anesthesia." 
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On March 5, 1996, David and Lisa Walski brought their 
three-year old son, Jonathan, to Dr. Watkins' office for a 
dental examination. During the examination, Dr. Watkins 
discovered four cavities and scheduled an appointment in 
May 1996 to fill them. Because Jonathan would not sit still, 
Dr. Watkins decided during the March visit that general 
anesthesia should be used while treating Jonathan. As was 
his practice, Dr. Watkins arranged for Dr. Mazula to 
administer the anesthesia to Jonathan in Dr. Watkins' 
office during the May appointment. On May 1, Dr. Mazula 
did administer general anesthesia to Jonathan, and Dr. 
Watkins began the repair of Jonathan's teeth. During the 
procedure, Jonathan experienced cardiac arrest and 
underwent emergency treatment. Dr. Watkins, who had 
been trained and previously certified in cardio-pulmonary 
resuscitation (CPR), but lacked a current certification, 
administered CPR to Jonathan. Emergency medical 
personnel were also called to the scene, but Jonathan could 
not be revived. 
 
On July 10, 1996, the Walskis filed a wrongful death 
action, in their own right and as administrators of 
Jonathan's estate, against Dr. Mazula (and his professional 
corporation) and the Watkins defendants in the Court of 
Common Pleas of Luzerne County, Pennsylvania. The 
Walskis' cause of action against Dr. Mazula alleged, among 
other things, that he "administered a general anesthetic" to 
Jonathan "in a negligent, careless, and reckless and 
wanton manner as a result of which Jonathan D. Walski 
suffered a cardiac arrest leading to his death." Ultimately, 
the Walskis settled their claims against Dr. Mazula. 2 
 
The Walski's cause of action against the Watkins 
defendants asserted that Dr. Watkins did not obtain their 
informed consent before prescribing the anesthesia for 
Jonathan in March 1996 and that Dr. Watkins was 
negligent in various ways during that March visit with 
respect to his decision to anesthetize the boy and to employ 
Dr. Mazula to administer the anesthesia. The action against 
the Watkins defendants also alleged that Dr. Watkins was 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. In December 1996, Dr. Mazula also pleaded guilty to involuntary 
manslaughter in connection with the death of Jonathan Walski. 
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negligent in his treatment of Jonathan in May 1996 after 
Jonathan had suffered the cardiac arrest. 
 
Medical Protective provided a defense to the Watkins 
defendants, subject to a reservation of its right to seek a 
declaration that its policies did not cover the Watkins 
defendants with respect to the Walskis' claims. Medical 
Protective then brought this declaratory judgment action in 
the United States District Court for the Middle District of 
Pennsylvania against the Watkins defendants and the 
Walskis, seeking a declaration that the Watkins defendants 
were not covered by the Medical Protective policies because 
the claims "arise from the administration of anesthesia." 
The case was submitted to the District Court on a joint 
stipulation of facts and cross-motions for summary 
judgment. On August 20, 1998, the District Court ruled 
that the policies provided no coverage for any liability which 
arises from the administration of anesthesia. He therefore 
granted summary judgment in favor of Medical Protective. 
Specifically, the court found that the language of Exclusion 
100 was unambiguous and applicable, see District Court 
Memorandum at 4-5, and that the doctrine of reasonable 
expectations was inapplicable, id. at 5-6. The Watkins 
defendants appealed. 
 
II. DISCUSSION 
 
The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction under 
28 U.S.C. S 1332(a), as the diversity and amount-in- 
controversy requirements were met. We have jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. S 1291, as this appeal is from a final 
judgment that disposed of all parties' claims. 
 
"When reviewing an order granting summary judgment 
we exercise plenary review and apply the same test the 
district court should have applied." Armbruster v. Unisys 
Corp., 32 F.3d 768, 777 (3d Cir. 1994). "Under Federal Rule 
of Civil Procedure 56(c), that test is whether there is a 
genuine issue of material fact and, if not, whether the 
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Id. 
"As to materiality, the substantive law will identify which 
facts are material. Only disputes over facts that might affect 
the outcome of the suit under the governing law will 
 
                                6 
  
properly preclude the entry of summary judgment." 
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). 
In addition, "summary judgment will not lie if the dispute 
about a material fact is `genuine,' that is, if the evidence is 
such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the 
nonmoving party." Id. Finally, "[w]e review the facts in the 
light most favorable to the party against whom summary 
judgment was entered." Coolspring Stone Supply, Inc. v. 
American States Life Ins. Co., 10 F.3d 144, 146 (3d Cir. 
1993). 
 
In addition, the interpretation of the scope of coverage of 
an insurance contract is a question of law properly decided 
by the court, a question over which we exercise plenary 
review. Reliance Ins. Co. v. Moessner, 121 F.3d 895, 900 
(3d Cir. 1997); McMillan v. State Mut. Life Assur. Co., 922 
F.2d 1073, 1074 (3d Cir. 1990). The parties agree that 
Pennsylvania law governs this case. 
 
A. Ambiguity 
 
We are guided by well-settled principles of Pennsylvania 
law governing the interpretation of insurance policies. 
When the language of an insurance contract is clear and 
unambiguous, a court is required to enforce that language. 
Standard Venetian Blind Co. v. American Empire Ins. Co., 
469 A.2d 563, 566 (Pa. 1983). Furthermore, if possible, "a 
court should interpret the policy so as to avoid ambiguities 
and give effect to all of its provisions." Little v. MGIC Indem. 
Corp., 836 F.2d 789, 793 (3d Cir. 1987). 
 
The courts have held, however, that "if the policy 
provision is reasonably susceptible to more than one 
interpretation, it is ambiguous." McMillan, 922 F.2d at 
1075. "In determining whether a contract is ambiguous, the 
court must examine the questionable term or language in 
the context of the entire policy and decide whether the 
contract is `reasonably susceptible of different 
constructions and capable of being understood in more 
than one sense.' " Reliance Ins. Co., 121 F.3d at 900 (citing 
Gamble Farm Inn, Inc. v. Selective Ins. Co., 656 A.2d 142, 
143-44 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995) (quoting Hutchison v. 
Sunbeam Coal Corp., 519 A.2d 385, 390 (Pa. 1986))); see 
also Little, 836 F.2d at 794 (holding that, even if insurer's 
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interpretation is reasonable, if insured's interpretation is 
also reasonable, then provision is ambiguous and should 
be construed in favor of insured). "Ambiguous provisions in 
an insurance policy must be construed against the insurer 
and in favor of the insured; any reasonable interpretation 
offered by the insured, therefore, must control." McMillan, 
922 F.2d at 1075. This rule has been applied liberally in 
Pennsylvania. Id. at 1075 & n.1. 
 
As we explained in McMillan, two pragmatic justifications 
have been offered by the courts for this rule of 
interpretation. First, "insurance policies are not ordinary 
contracts but are contracts of adhesion between two parties 
not equally situated and thus equity requires their 
interpretation in favor of the weaker party." Id. at 1075. 
"The insurer is an expert in its field `and its varied and 
complex instruments are prepared by it unilaterally 
whereas the assured . . . is a layperson unversed in 
insurance provisions and practices.' " Id. (quoting Allen v. 
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 208 A.2d 638, 644 (N.J. 1965)). 
The second justification is that the courts apply"the 
familiar contract rule interpreting ambiguity against the 
scrivener, recalling the hoary maxim ambigua responsio 
contra proferentem est accipienda" -- that is, "[a]n 
ambiguous answer is to be taken against him who offers it." 
Id. at 1075 & n.2. Explaining its adoption of this rule of 
interpretation, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court wrote: "The 
person who writes with ink which spreads and 
simultaneously produces two conflicting versions of the 
same proposition cannot complain if the person affected by 
both propositions chooses to accept that which is more 
helpful to him and which is against the interests of the 
contract writer." Sykes v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 198 
A.2d 844, 845 (Pa. 1964) (quoted in McMillan, 922 F.2d at 
1075). 
 
In the instant case, Exclusion 100 states that the policy 
does not cover "any liability arising from the administration 
of any form of anesthesia in dosage designed to render the 
patient unconscious unless administered in a hospital." The 
clause fails to refer specifically to the person or class of 
persons for whose acts of administering general anesthesia 
the exclusion applies. Medical Protective's position is that 
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the clause is clear and unambiguous in denying coverage 
for any liability arising from the administration by any 
person of any form of anesthesia, unless administered in a 
hospital. While this interpretation may be reasonable, the 
interpretation offered by the insured is also reasonable. The 
Watkins defendants suggest that one could interpret the 
clause to exclude coverage only when the administration of 
the anesthetic is performed by the policy holder, Dr. 
Watkins, or his employees. We find this interpretation 
eminently reasonable, especially since the exclusion is in 
the context of a policy that provides coverage against 
liability for Dr. Watkins' own acts and the acts of persons 
for whom he is legally responsible. In the case of a dentist 
who does not administer general anesthesia, review of 
Exclusion 100 could lead the dentist reasonably to 
conclude that, because he does not administer such 
anesthesia, he will not be subject to the exclusion if he is 
sued in connection with the administration of general 
anesthesia by a qualified independent contractor. Indeed, 
Dr. Watkins testified: "I felt that since I was not 
administering the anesthesia, [the exclusion] didn't really 
pertain to me, that I would have coverage if someone else 
was administering the anesthesia." 
 
Medical Protective's interpretation, moreover, requires an 
insured to read into the exclusionary clause the phrase "by 
any person." The burden of precisely drafting the policy 
rested with the insurance company and scrivener, Medical 
Protective, and it was free to employ more precise language. 
"An insurer's failure to utilize more distinct language which 
is available reinforces a conclusion of ambiguity under 
Pennsylvania law." McMillan, 922 F.2d at 1077. 
 
We note that we do not find persuasive the District 
Court's reliance on Northern Ins. Co. v. Aardvark Assoc., 
942 F.2d 189, 194 (3d Cir. 1991), in which we held that an 
insurance policy clause excluding coverage for liability 
" `arising out of the discharge, dispersal, release or escape' 
of pollutants" was unambiguous, even though the clause 
did not identify the polluters (active or passive). Id. (quoting 
policy language). The District Court analogized Exclusion 
100 to the pollution exclusion, holding that "[a]s in 
Northern Ins., the identity of the one who administers the 
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anesthesia is not necessary to render the language of the 
exclusion clear and unambiguous." District Court 
Memorandum at 5. Medical Protective urges us to follow 
Northern Ins. and other pollution cases construing identical 
policy language that have also rejected distinctions based 
on the identity of the actor or the nature of its conduct. See 
Hyde Athletic Indus., Inc. v. Continental Cas. Co. , 969 F. 
Supp. 289 (E.D. Pa. 1997); Federal Ins. Co. v. Susquehanna 
Broad. Co., 727 F. Supp. 169 (M.D. Pa. 1989), aff'd mem., 
928 F.2d 1131 (3d Cir. 1991); O'Brien Energy Sys., Inc. v. 
American Employers' Ins. Co., 629 A.2d 957 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
1993). 
 
We must, however, examine purportedly ambiguous 
language in the context of the entire policy. Reliance Ins. 
Co., 121 F.3d at 900. The pollution exclusion clause in the 
general liability policies at issue in the Northern Ins. line of 
cases does not deal with personal, professional services. 
Rather than turning on what any individual did or did not 
do, the exclusion depends on whether something was done 
by, or happened to, any of a specific group of inanimate 
things -- that is, on whether any pollutants were 
discharged, dispersed, released, or escaped. The exclusion 
applies to any resulting claim against the insured, and it 
does not matter whether any individual employed by the 
insured, or anyone else, did or did not do anything to cause 
the pollution. In contrast, the professional liability policy in 
this case necessarily deals with professional services 
performed by the named dentists and their employees. The 
"administration of anesthesia" in Exclusion 100 must refer 
to the administration of anesthesia by someone specific. 
The coverage must be tied to the performance of 
professional services by the named insureds. Professional 
medical services simply are not analogous to a condition 
like pollution that may be caused by many parties that are 
difficult to identify. 
 
Thus, in light of the fact that the Watkins defendants 
have offered a reasonable alternative interpretation of the 
exclusionary clause, we find that the clause is ambiguous. 
See Butterfield v. Giuntoli, 670 A.2d 646, 652 n.8 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 1995) ("[I]f a policy is reasonably susceptible of 
two interpretations, it must be construed in the insured's 
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favor so as not to defeat, unless clearly necessary, the claim 
to indemnity which the insured intended to obtain."). The 
rule of construing insurance policies in favor of the insured 
applies especially when, as here, an exclusionary clause is 
purportedly ambiguous, because "exceptions to the general 
liability of the insurer are to be strictly construed against 
the insurance company." Contrans, Inc. v. Ryder Truck 
Rental, Inc., 836 F.2d 163, 169 (3d Cir. 1987) (quoting 
Frisch v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 275 A.2d 849, 851 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 1971)). Finally, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
has cautioned that "if [a court] should err in determining 
the meaning of an insurance policy provision . . . ,[its] 
error should be in favor of coverage for the insured." Motley 
v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 466 A.2d 609, 611 (Pa. 1983).3 
 
Therefore, we must interpret the exclusionary clause in 
favor of Dr. Watkins. We hold that Exclusion 100 is 
inapplicable to the instant case and that the insurance 
policy covers the malpractice claims asserted against Dr. 
Watkins. 
 
B. Reasonable Expectations 
 
We also disagree with the District Court's analysis of the 
reasonable expectations argument. In light of 
Pennsylvania's doctrine of reasonable expectations, we find 
that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether 
Dr. Watkins had a reasonable expectation that he would be 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. We note that we do not take into consideration the Watkins 
defendants' further argument that, in Dr. Watkins' policy, the scope of 
Exclusion 100 is further rendered ambiguous by Endorsement 540, 
which amends (under the heading "Expanded Coverage Endorsement") 
the insurance policy by excluding liability incurred"under contract or 
agreement," but then excepts from that exclusion any liability incurred 
by the insured "in rendering professional services under any contract or 
agreement with another dentist or other provider of professional services 
in the practice of the insured's profession," as well as any liability 
incurred by the insured "in rendering professional services in connection 
with furnishing therapeutic agents or supplies in the practice of the 
insured's profession." This argument was not raised in the District 
Court, and "[i]t is well established that failure to raise an issue in the 
district court constitutes a waiver of the argument." Brenner v. Local 
514, 
United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, 927 F.2d 1283, 
1298 (3d Cir. 1991). 
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covered by the insurance policy as long as he arranged for 
anesthesia to be administered by a qualified person other 
than himself or one of his employees. 
 
In our recent discussion of Pennsylvania's reasonable 
expectations doctrine, we observed that "the proper focus 
for determining issues of insurance coverage is the 
reasonable expectations of the insured." Reliance Ins. Co., 
121 F.3d at 903 (citing Collister v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co., 
388 A.2d 1346 (Pa. 1978) and Tonkovic v. State Farm 
Mutual Auto Ins. Co., 521 A.2d 920 (Pa. 1987)). We noted 
that "[i]n most cases, `the language of the insurance policy 
will provide the best indication of the content of the parties' 
reasonable expectations.' " Id. (quoting Bensalem Tp. v. 
International Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 38 F.3d 1303, 1309 (3d 
Cir. 1994)). Nevertheless, we instructed that "[c]ourts . . . 
must examine `the totality of the insurance transaction 
involved to ascertain the reasonable expectations of the 
insured.' " Id. (quoting Dibble v. Security of Am. Life Ins. Co., 
590 A.2d 352, 354 (Pa. 1991)). "As a result, even the most 
clearly written exclusion will not bind the insured where 
the insurer or its agent has created in the insured a 
reasonable expectation of coverage." Id."[T]he insurer is 
bound not only by the expectations that it creates, but also 
by any other reasonable expectation of the insured. The 
insured's reasonable expect 
